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RECENT DECISIONS
offer to purchase and after a quarrel had told the claimant that he could
use the driveway so long as he was a good neighbor. The court said
that this showed permission and sufficiently explained the claimant's
subsequent use and rebutted the presumption that such use was adverse.
The principal case shows that the Wisconsin Court will follow the
majority rule and presume that use for the statutory period was adverse
where there is proof only of verbal protests against the use on specific
occasions but no evidence of the owner's having given any permission
or indulgence to so use.
PAUL F. KRUMHOLZ
Constitutional Law - Curfew Law Constitutional - Calvin W. Good-
win and his wife, Sophia D. Goodwin were convicted in the municipal
court of violating an ordinance of the City of Portland, making it un-
lawful for any person to roam or be upon any street between the hours
of 1:00 and 5:00 o'clock A.M. without having and disclosing a lawful
purpose. They appealed. The circuit court sustained their demurrers,
which alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of action and
that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The City ap-
pealed. Held: Reversed. The Supreme court stated: "the real question is
whether an ordinance such as this bears a sufficiently close relation to
the peace, safety and welfare of the public so far as to justify the in-
convenience to which law abiding citizens may occasionally be sub-
mitted." The court found that the ordinance bears a reasonable relation
to the evil at which it is directed. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 210
Pac. (2d) 577 (Oregon 1949).
Such ordinances come under the police power of the governing au-
thority, for everything contrary to public policy or inimical to the pub-
lic interest is the subject of the exercise of the state's police power.,
This is true because the possession of all rights are subject to such
reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of
the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals
of the community.2 It is a general rule that in order for a police meas-
ure to be reasonable, the means adopted must be reasonably necessary
and appropriate for the accomplishment of legitimate objects falling
within the scope of the power.3 It has also been held that a state in sup-
pressing what it regards as a public evil may adopt any reasonable
measures which it may deem necessary, and the reasonableness of a
police regulation is not necessarily what is best, but what is fairly ap-
' Gross v. Commonwealth, 256 Ky. 19, 75 S.W. (2d) 558 (.1934).
2Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183,20 S.Ct. 633, 44 L.Ed. 725 (1900).
3 11 C.J. 1075, 303.
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propriate under attendant circumstances.4 Furthermore courts will
declare a statute invalid only if manifestly unreasonable, and reason-
ableness is primarily a matter for the legislative judgment.5
However, there are jurisdictions which temper the broad scope of
the police power by requiring that the ordinances or statutes actually
remedy and remove the evil at which they are directed, for if it is mani-
fest that the statute or ordinance, under the guise of a police regula-
tion, does not tend to preserve the public health, safety, or welfare, it
is void as an invasion of the property rights of the individual.6 In Ex
parte McCarver the court held invalid a nine o'clock curfew ordinance
which prohibited any person under twenty-one years of age from being
upon the streets unless accompanied by parent or guardian. The ordi-
nance was construed as prohibiting legitimate errands or necessary
business.
7
In United States v. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, the court seemed
to indicate that an emergency would have to exist before a curfew
could be imposed when it said, "there must, of course, be extraordinary
reasons to justify curfew for or removal, even from a Military area, of
American citizens therein. But with respect to those of Japanese
ancestry in Military Area No. 1 certainly since Pearl Harbor most
extraordinary reasons have been obtained."
In the instant case the court held that the priveleges and immunities
of the defendants had not been violated. As to personal liberty, a right
possessed by every citizen of the United States, the court in United
States v. Kaplan said, "Liberty means more than nonconfinement in
jails; it means the right to enjoy one's life uninterruptedly and unin-
terfered with so long as the rights of others be not invaded, and so long
as the laws of the land are not violated in a way that will evidence
probable cause of such violation."9 Furthermore personal liberty, which
is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists
of the right of locomotion,-to go where one pleases, and when, and
to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far
restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare
of all other citizens.'0 Also, in Pennsylvania it is held that freedom of
locomotion, although subject to proper restrictions, is included in the
"liberty" guaranteed by our Constitution." Thus it would seem that
the right to freely walk the streets can not be taken away from a per-
4 16 C.J.S. 542, 175.
5 State v. Kincaid, 133 Or. 95, 285 P. 1105 (1930).6 People v. Carolene Products Co., 345 Ill. 166, 177 N.E. 698, (1931).
7 Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 46 S.W. 936, 42 L.R.A. 587 (1898).8 United States v. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, 46 F.Supp. 657 (D.C. Wash.
1942).
9 United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (D.C. Ga. 1923).
10 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579 (1899).
11 Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa.Super. 187, 167 A. 241 (1933).
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son unless an emergency exists which makes the curtailment of the
right necessary, or unless he is so acting that he is violating the rights
of others, or gives indication that he will violate the rights of others,
or that he is breaking or will break some valid law.
In the instant case there was no showing of an emergency, nor was
there any showing that the defendants were violating the rights of
others or that they were violating any valid laws. Therefore it is the
opinion of the writer that the ordanance in the instant case is not a valid
exercise of the police power because it violates the right of the individ-
ual to move about freely without interrogation by police as to his pur-
pose when conducting himself in an orderly manner, without violating
the rights of others, or violating any valid law.
EMIL SE3ETIC
Labor Law -Financial Contribution by Employer to Union as Un-
fair Labor Practice - In the midst of negotiations for a new contract
between the defendant union and the employer, the proprietor of a
small beauty shop employing four employees, the defendant demanded
that the employer join the union as a non-voting or non-active member.
When he refused to do so the defendant began peacefully to picket his
place of business, whereupon the employer applied to the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board for relief. The Board found the defen-
dant guilty of an unfair labor practice under the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act and instituted the present suit for an injunction to enforce
their order that the union cease picketing. Held: Section 111.06(1) (b),
Wisconsin Statutes, defines as an unfair labor practice employer contri-
bution of financial support to any labor organization, and though it
is true that the term "financial support" is much broader than the
mere payment of dues and includes financial support of any kind, it
also includes the payment of dues. Picketing an employer to compel
him to do that which the law prohibits him from doing is not con-
stitutionally protected free speech and may be enjoined. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 256 Wis.
77, 39 N. W. (2d) 725 (1949).
In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union: the United States Su-
preme Court held that there is no absolute federal constitutional right
of an individual to work with his hands, and that a state statute might
authorize or permit the union to picket his shop to make him stop doing
so in order to spread employment of union members. And in Cafeteria
Employees Union v. Angelos2 they determined that a state court may
1 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229 (1937).
2320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58 (1943).
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